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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from a final judgment of the District Court
for the Fifth Judicial Court of Beaver County.

This appeal seeks

review of a Judgment entered on May 16, 1995.
This Court has jurisdiction in this case pursuant to Utah Code
§78-2-2 (3) (j) Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended.

ISSUES FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OP REVIEW

(1)

Did the Court err in holding that a long existing fence

had not become a boundary by acquiescence?
The factual determinations of the trial court will not be
disturbed unless clearly erroneous.

Grayson Roper Ltd.Partnership

VS. Pinlinson 782 P.2d 467, 470 (Utah 1989).
(2)

Did the Court err in holding that Defendants did not

commit a trespass on Plaintiff's property?
The trial court's determination as to the applicable law is
reviewed for correctness. Transamerica Cash Reserve Inc. vs. Dixie
Power and Water, Inc.

789 P.2d 24, 25(Utah 1990).

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Appellant

believes

that

there

are

no

constitutional

provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules or regulations that are
determinative.

NATURE OF THE CASE

This

is

an

action

for trespass

brought

by Appellants,

("Parkinson and Larsen") against Appellees ("Rikers").

They claim

that Rikers destroyed a long existing fence and irrigation ditch
and built a road on property on Parkinson and Larsenfs side of the
fence which has been in place for more than fifty years; that the
fence which approximates the quarter section line, if not the
quarter section line,

defines a boundary by acquiescence.

Defendants claim that a survey they commissioned establishes
that there is a deeded right-of-way on the disputed land for their
use.

They counterclaimed,

seeking to quiet title to the disputed

property in their favor. The trial court dismissed the Plaintiffs1
trespass action finding there was no evidence the fence was a
boundary fence and that Defendants had built the road on a deeded
right-of-way. The court made no ruling on Defendants' counterclaim
for quiet title.

Parkinson and Larsen appealed from the

dismissal of their complaint.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Rikers purchased a twenty acre parcel from Myrl P. Lessing
("Lessing") by warranty deed recorded July 28, 1989. (R., p. 157,
Exhibit 39) .

The parcel is located east of an old fence which

runs north and south generally along the quarter section line.

It

is described in the deed as follows:
The South half of the Northeast (sic) quarter, of the Northwest
quarter of Section 10, Township 29 South, Range 7 West, Salt
lake Base and Meridian.
2

Parkinson and Larsen, as well as others who were not parties
to this action, own parcels which are west of the fence.
Lessing had acquired title to the parcel by a Partition Order
issued by the Fifth Judicial District Court for Beaver County
entered August 8, 1987, and recorded September 25, 1987. (R. , p.
157, Exhibit D-15).

The grant to Lessing in the Partition Order

included a right-of-way for access across two other parcels created
by the Partition Order which lie east of Lessing's parcel. (R. , p.
157, Exhibit D-15, paragraph e.)
The deed from Lessing to Rikers (Exhibit 39) included the
right-of-way which was granted to Lessing by the Court order.

It

is described in the deed as follows:
"TOGETHER WITH a 30 foot right-of-way conveyed to the granter
herein from the Southeast corner of the above described
property, running Easterly to the County Road."
The deed also described a right-of-way which approached the
property from the south.

The right-of-way is described as

follows:
"Beginning 80 rods East of the West 1/4 corner of Section 10,
Township 29 South, Range 7 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian;
thence North 120 rods; thence east 30 feet; thence South 120
rods; thence West 3 0 feet to beginning."
Rikers, residents of California at the time of the purchase,
were nonetheless familiar with the property.

Defendant, Jesse

Riker, testified that he was a general contractor in California and
that in 1980 he designed and helped build a house for Ronnie
Anderson on property which adjoined the Lessing property to the
north.

At that time he walked the Lessing property.

Every time

he came to Utah he looked at the property and tried to find out if
3

he could buy it "because it was tied up in court with the death.11
He testified that he was concerned with the "pretty corner" with
"all those oak trees" where he now has his house; that he didn't
care about the rest of the property. (Trial transcript, 3/7/95,
pp.109-113).
Jesse Riker also testified that when he had been at the
property he had observed the fence in question; that the fence had
no bearing on the purchase or use he intended to make of the
Lessing property. (Trial transcript, 3/7/95, pp. 117-118).
Further, that Rikers used an east/west access to their residence
until the property was subdivided in 1990.

A parcel was sold to

a buyer from California who closed off Rikers' access. (Trial
transcript, 3/7/95, pp. 130-131).
that he then

"had

no way

Jesse Riker told Hazel Larsen

of getting

transcript, 3/7/95, p. 128),

to

[his] home. "(Trial

The deed Rikers received from

Lessing still provided the east/west right-of-way directly to a
county road which was granted in the Partition Order.
(Exhibit D-39).
Mike Dalton, a title officer testified for the Rikers as to
documents he had retrieved from the Office of the Beaver County
Recorder.

He concluded

from his examination that Arnold

Parkinson, father of Foch Parkinson, had acquired ownership of the
property east of the fence in 1919 and 1928 referring to Exhibit D26 and Exhibit D-27.

He also identified Exhibit D-28, indicating

that it was a certified copy of a deed which involved property
which was included in the partition action , but was not involved
4

in the suit.

However, he failed to refer to another deed on the

same exhibit; that deed is in the direct chain of title to the
property now owned by plaintiffs ( and a portion of the property
now owned by the other Californian who cut off Rikers1 access).
That deed, dated March 29, 1944, and recorded November 29, 1950,
describes the east line of the property conveyed as "the fence" and
the south boundary as "the north side of the county road". (R. ,
p.157, Exhibit D-28).
action.

The fence is the one in question in this

The county road is the one shown as the south boundary of

Plaintiff Larsen's parcel.
Plaintiff Hazel Larsen testified that she owned a farm and an
upholstery shop.

She testified as to her direct knowledge of the

fence as follows:
11

. . .what we have always known for all our life as the boundary

line going up this old fence line here...north and south." (Trial
transcript, 6/21/94 pp. 22-23, emphasis added.)
She further testified that there was an old right-of-way to
Rikers property which was on the east side of the fence through an
existing gate.

(Id, pp.24-29).

She identified

exhibit P-3

stating:
A.

It shows the old fence line —

the old road on the east

side of what we thought was the boundary fence.
Q.

Does it show the fence?

A.

Yes it does.

She described the property the plaintiffs lost by Rikers
building the new road west of the torn down fence as 71 feet wide
5

on one end and approximately 3 0 feet on the other end. (Id, pp.
34).
Plaintiff Foch Parkinson testified that he was 76, a farmer
and owned a truck wash; that he formerly was in the dairy business
and a trader of horses and cattle; that he could remember the
property since when he was a child. (Id., pp. 57-58).
He further testified that the right-of-way through the gate
east of the old fence had been there all of his life.

That he had

used it as had "all the people that had an interest in the Johnny
Smith ditch..." (Id., pp. 62-65).

When asked how his property

was separated from other owners he replied, "Well, they've got
fences between us." ( Id, p. 61).
James Parkinson testified for the plaintiffs that he was 40
years old and that he had been on the property most of his life.
With respect to the fence he testified that:
"...the property that I acquired used to belong to the Limbs.
It was a — a property line between them and my grandfather.

It

was a boundary line." (Trial transcript, 3/7/95 p. 15, emphasis
added).

He further testified that after the partition order the

fence was recognized as a boundary line.

His testimony, referring

to the grantees in the Partition Order was:
Q.

...Now, what purpose did the fence serve among those

parties?
A.

It was a boundary line from —

estate, everybody got from that fence —

when they broke up the

some got some on the west

side of it, and some got some on the east side of it....
6

Q.

You say that it was a boundary line when they broke up

the estate, is that right?
A.

Yes.

Q.

All right.

A.

Well, it was a boundary line.

own this property.
Q.

What was it before that?
Because my father did not

He acquired it later... It was a boundary line.

During the period of time that you were acquainted with

the property and the fence, did you know of any use that was made
of it?
A.

It was a property line and to keep other animals off

this guy's property.
THE COURT:

Which guy?

THE WITNESS:

The guy that owned this years ago.

(Trial

transcript, 3/7/95, p. 17-18, emphasis added).
James Parkinson then identified Exhibit P-21, a photograph
which he testified: "It shows a —

a picture of the old fence and

the old wooden gate we used to go through on the east side of the
old fence."

He further testified that the photograph showed the

fence which he had already described as the boundary line and a
roadway.
Q.

With respect to the roadway he testified:
All right.

Now, P-21 —

what do you know about the

roadway depicted in P-21?
A.

That's the —

the access road getting into these other

properties.
Q.

All right.

And who put that in?

A.

I have no idea. It's been there all my life. (Id,pp. 25-27) .
7

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In determining whether there was a boundary by acquiescence
the court should have (1) considered the testimony of Plaintiffs1
three witnesses to the effect that a long existing fence was
recognized as a boundary; (2) considered a 1944 deed to Plaintiffs1
predecessor in title that used the fence in describing the east
boundary of the property conveyed•
Public policy favors the determination of boundaries based
upon historic, peaceable usage instead of by a survey which
prorates distances and creates a detached strip of land which
adversely affects other property owners not involved in this
action.
ARGUMENT
I.

PLAINTIFFS PROVED THAT THE FENCE WAS A BOUNDARY.

Defendants produced no evidence to refute the testimony of the
plaintiffs1 witnesses that the fence that Defendants tore down was
a boundary fence.

As shown above, the record contains the

testimony of three witnesses who had grown up on the property that
the fence was a boundary between the neighbors on either side.
There is a four pronged test to determine a boundary by
acquiescence.

The elements of boundary by acquiescence are:

(1) occupation up to a visible line marked by monuments, fences or
buildings; (2) mutual acquiescence to the line as a boundary; (3)
for a long period of time, generally not less than 2 0 years; (4) by
adjoining landowners. Carter v. Hanrath, 885 P. 2d 801 (Ct. App.
1994) citing from Staker v. Ainsworth, 785 P.2d 417, 420.
8

The

trial

established.

court

found

that

the

first

element

had

been

The court, however, found that plaintiffs had failed

to prove the second element- "mutual acquiescence to the line as a
boundary".

The court addressed this element as follows:

"There must be mutual acquiescence in the fence in this
case as a boundary.
That has not — not been proven by the
plaintiff.
I have no evidence whatsoever as to who put in
the fence or for what purpose.
I don f t even no when it was
put in." (Trial transcript, 3/7/95, p. 140 emphasis added.)
The court did not comment on the third element, the length of
time, but did comment on the fourth-"by adjoining land owners."
The court stated:
"the evidence I do have shows that the same person owned both
sides of the fence as early as 1925, as I recall." (The court
corrected the date, after comment by the defendant1 counsel,
to 1928.)
The court continued,
"Obviously there can't be a boundary by acquiescence
where a fence runs through property owned on both sides by the
same owner.
You can't agree by yourself to make this a
boundary across your own property.
That's nonsensical.
Besides which, the fourth element of boundary by acquiescence
is that it has to be a boundary between adjoining property
owners.
And those have to be different property owners.
So
there has been no evidence that the fence was ever intended as
a boundary by whoever put it in. And we don't know who that
was. (Id, p. 141).
Finally, the court concluded:
"Now the question becomes did anybody in the intervening
years from the time it was put in until now mutually agree
that that was going to be the boundary of the property.
I
have no evidence that that's ever taken place.
We've had
lots of people own property along that fence on both sides,
but I have no evidence that anybody ever agreed that was going
to be a boundary line.
The fence has just sat there, and
people have bought and taken title to property in accordance
with the general legal descriptions that are laid out by
survey.
No evidence has been presented that would indicate
that anybody ever agreed that that fence line was going to be
the boundary between these two pieces of property at any point
9

versus the —

the survey line." (Id., p.141 emphasis added).

The trial court placed too great a burden of proof on the
plaintiffs.

Earlier decisions of this Court make it clear that the

party claiming a boundary by acquiescence does not have to prove
when a long standing fence or other monument was erected or by
whom.

Because there are often no living witnesses to construction

or usage of long existing fences and the like, this Court held in
Jensen v. Bartlett, 286 P.2d 804, (Utah 1955) that:
"It is well recognized by this court that where the
parties have acquiesced in a fence as marking the boundary line for
a long period of time, it is immaterial whether there was an
express agreement to that effect or not.
Under such proof the
court will indulge a fiction, or hold there is a presumption that
such an agreement existed." (citations omitted).
As discussed

above, the deed

from Lessing to the

contained two separate right-of-way descriptions.

Rikers

One which the

court order established in the partition action and a second one
which accessed the property from the south on the dividing line
between Plaintiffs and neighbors to the west.

Defendants hired a

surveyor, Marcus A. Twedt, to locate the second right-of-way.
The survey done by Twedt was marked Exhibit D-l
received into evidence.
follows on page 11-A,

and was

The survey map, copy of which here

contains the following under "Narrative":

"PRIMARY PURPOSE OF THIS SURVEY IS TO DETERMINE THE LOCATION
OF THE 3 0 • DEEDED RIGHT-OF-WAY.
ALL BUT TWO SECTION CORNERS
LOCATED BY PRO-RATING DISTANCE FROM CORNER SECTIONS..."
Plaintiffs1 witness, James Parkinson testified that he had
found a BLM marker which was 18 feet from the one set by Twedt.
He

also

testified

that by measuring
10

from the BLM marker

the

distance "comes out right —

real close to that old gate.

Within

a few feet, ( Referring to the gate which he had identified in
Exhibits

P-7

and

P-21.)(Trial

Reproductions of Exhibits

transcript,

3/7/95,

p.

43)

P-21 which shows the gate, P-3, which

depicts the old road as it continues northward from the gate and
Exhibit P-13, which shows the road which Rikers built west of the
fence and old road, are shown on page 11-B here following.
II. THE FINDING THAT BOTH SIDES OF THE FENCE WERE OWNED BY
PLAINTIFFS1 PREDECESSOR IN TITLE IS INCORRECT.
The trial court relied

on the testimony

of defendant's

witness, Michael Dalton, to conclude that the property now owned by
plaintiffs was acquired by Arnold Parkinson between 1919 and 1928;
that he also owned property on the west side of the old fence at
the

same

time.

Dalton, however, neglected

to

take

into

consideration a later deed in which Arnold Parkinson was the
grantee; a deed which referred to the old fence as the east
boundary of the property now owned by plaintiffs and others.
(Exhibit D-28).

Although the chain of title in the record is not

complete, it is clear that sometime between 1928 and 1944 Arnold
Parkinson sold (or perhaps during the depression years lost) the
property now owned by plaintiffs.

Later, in 1944, he reacquired

the property by a deed which clearly recognized the fence as the
east boundary of the property conveyed.

Accordingly, the court's

findings that "...there can't be a boundary by acquiescence where
a fence runs through property owned on both sides by the same
owner" and "no evidence has been presented that would indicate that
anybody ever agreed that the fence line was going to be the
11
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boundary between these two pieces of property at any point versus
the —

survey line" ( Trial transcript, 3/7/95, p.141) are clearly

incorrect when the 1944 deed is taken into consideration.
III. ACCEPTING THE TWEDT SURVEY AS THE CORRECT BOUNDARY WOULD
SPAWN ADDITIONAL BOUNDARY DISPUTES,
As noted above the Twedt survey was done for the purpose of
locating the right-of-way and not for establishing the boundary.
Twedt noted on the map (Exhibit D-l) that only two section corners
were located; that the other corners were established by proration.

Twedt!s establishing the boundaries by proration rather

than reliance on the metes and bounds descriptions and references
to monuments, such as in the 1944 deed which used the fence and the
county

road

as

boundary

unacceptable side effect.

lines

(Exhibit

D-28),

causes

an

His survey results in the acquisition

by plaintiffs, and all the rest of the property owners west of the
old fence, of a thin strip of land on the west side of "Old Highway
91".

It would be disturbing news to the owners on the west side

of the highway that they have no highway frontage.

If plaintiffs

or the other property owners were to assert ownership to the
windfall highway frontage more litigation would be the result.
Where does it end?

At the Utah-Nevada border?

The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that the "doctrine of
boundary by acquiescence rests on sound public policy of avoiding
trouble and litigation over boundaries." Ekberg v. Bates, 239 P.2d
205 (Utah 1951).
Here, the Rikers who came to Utah in 1989 to build a house in
12

the "pretty corner" and who didn't care about the rest of the
property (Trial transcript, 3/7/95, pp. 109-113) have knocked down
a fence and bulldozed an irrigation ditch rather than improve an
existing road which neighbors for years have recognized and used
peaceably.
Some people travel west to Utah, admire its beauty and say it
should be wilderness; untouched by man.

Others move east to Utah

to escape congested, crime-infested coastal cities.
come to Utah with
ranchers,

and

other

little regard
descendants

Too many

for the rights of farmers,
of pioneers

who

have

lived

peaceably as neighbors for generations.
CONCLUSION
The trial court erred when it failed to establish a boundary
by acquiescence.

This Court should remand this case to the trial

court with instructions to enter judgment in favor of plaintiffs
establishing the old fence as a boundarv.
Respectfully submijtted^thi^ /) //day of January, 1996.

v/^]A^^^

Jter^&ph ^arlan Burns
z^£torney for Plaintiffs/Appellants
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that two copies of the foregoing Brief of
Appellants were hand delivered to J. Brian Jackson, Attorney for
Defendants/Appellees this

^ T V a a y of January, /£9^)6.

A D D E N D U M

the Court having received evidence, heard testimony or witnesses,
argument of counsel, and having reviewed the file and good cause
appearing the Court now enters the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

That jurisdiction and venue are proper.

2.

That Plaintiffs' claim is not procluded by the Doctrine of

Res Judicate.
3. That Plaintiff's claim is not procluded by the Doctrine of
Colleteral Estoppel.
4.

That

Plaintiffs'

claims

for

Trespass,

Boundry

by

Acquiescence and Damages together with all other claims asserted in
Plaintiffs' Complaint are dismissed, the Plaintiffs having failed
to prove Boundry by Acquiesence, Trespass or Damages resulting from
Defendants' improvement and upgrade of an existing lane along and
within the deeded right of way to Defendants' property.
From the above Findings of Fact this Court now concludes:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Doctrine of Res Judicate does not proclude Plaintiffs'
claims as a matter of law.
2.

The Doctrine of Colleteral Estoppel does not proclude

Plaintiffs' claims as a matter of law.
3.

Plaintiffs' claims for Trespass, Boundry by Acquiesence

and Damages, together with all other claims asserted in Plaintiffs'
Complaint, are dismissed

with prejudice

and

on the merits

as

against these Defendants, the Plaintiffs having failed to establish
Boundry by Acquiesence, Trespass, or Damages resulting from
Defendants' improvement of an existing lane within and along the
deeded right of way to Defendants' property.
WITNESS my hand and the seal of this Court this

day of
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THE COURT: All right.

Obviously there can be

no trespass if, in fact, Mr. Riker was privileged by the
exercise of an easement which he had acquired to traverse
the property that he traversed in putting in his road.
He's entitled to remove obstructions from that right-of-way
if he has a right-of-way that he can use.
The question then becomes whether or not the
right to use that property is controlled by deeds and
surveys, or whether it's controlled by the doctrine of
boundary by acquiescence.
Boundary by acquiescence has specific elements
which must be established.

There must be occupation up to

a visible line marked by monuments, fences or buildings.
Obviously that's been established.

Mr. Parkinson and

others have testified that the property on both sides of
the fence —

fence was fully occupied.

There must be mutual acquiescence in the fence
in this case as a boundary.
proven by the plaintiff.

That has been —

I have no evidence whatsoever as

to who put in the fence or for what purpose.
know when it was put in.

not been

I don't even

The evidence I do have shows that

this same person owned both sides of at least the bottom
portion of that fence as early as 1925, as I recall.
let me look.
MR. JACKSON:

28, Your Honor.

PAUL G. MCMULLIN

But

141
THE COURT:

28. 1928.

Obviously there can't be a boundary by
acquiescence where a fence runs through property owned on
both sides by the same owner.

You can't agree by yourself

to make this a boundary across your own property.
nonsensical.

That's

Besides which, the fourth element of boundary

by acquiescence is that it has to be a boundary between
adjoining property owners. And those have to be different
property owners.

So there has been no evidence that the

fence was ever intended as a boundary by whoever put it
in.

And we don't know who that was.
Now the question becomes did anybody in the

intervening years from the time it was put in until now
mutually agree that that was going to be the boundary of
the property.
place.

I have no evidence that that's ever taken

We've had lots of people own property along that

fence on both sides, but I have no evidence that anybody
ever agreed that was going to be a boundary line.

The

fence has just sat there, and people have bought and taken
title to property in accordance with the general legal
descriptions that are laid out by survey.

No evidence has

been presented that would indicate that anybody ever agreed
that that fence line was going to be the boundary between
these two pieces of property at any point versus the —
survey line.

PAUL G. MCMULLIN

the

142
So I find that the plaintiff has failed to
establish boundary by acquiescence.
I granted the Motion —

or I denied the Motion

to Dismiss after the plaintiffs' case, as I said, because I
wanted to give the —

the benefit of the doubt to the

plaintiff and give the defendant an opportunity to present
their evidence.

But the defendants' evidence as presented

by Mr. Dalton clearly indicates that Arnold Parkinson owned
this property way back.
don't know.

And whether he built the fence, I

But that's as far back as the evidence goes.

And at that time, the fence, if it was there, ran through
his property, not adjoining —

not across adjoining —

or

between adjoining pieces.
Given that, the question —
is the fence —

I —

may Mr. Riker remove the fence?

shows that the fence was on his property.
fence.

the question is

He can do what he wants with it.

The survey

And it's his
In addition, he

had a right to an easement which was deeded to him properly
and which is of record.
So I'm going to find in favor of the defendants
and against the plaintiffs and find that the plaintiffs
have no cause of action, they having failed in their proof.
MR. JACKSON:
MR. BURNS:

Thank you, Your Honor.

Your Honor, may we have findings of

fact and conclusions of law?

PAULO. MCMULLIN

